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Gabriel Kolko. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace.
London: Rout~dge, 1997, 190p.
This book undoubtedly appeals to those who lament
the demise of socialist economics in Vietnam as well
as to the critics of a market economy. However, the
supporters of doi moi, both within Vietnam and
without, will find the author's anti-market
philosophy objectionable and his analyses of
economic change since the inception of the new
policy confused or wrong. But they will find the
part of the book dealing with anti-market forces
extremely useful.
The major strength of this book is the author's
knowledge of Vietnam, built over the past three
decades. As an anti-war activist during the
Vietnam War, he began visiting North Vietnam and
got to know its leaders. However, since Vietnam
opted out for a market economy about a decade ago,
a decision he deplores, his relations with Vietnamese
leadership seems to have become distant, but he has
kept himself informed on them through mass media
and his personal networks with the Vietnamese who
share his socialist ideals. One of his interesting
revelations is that in 1996, out of the eighteen
Politburo members, only four were clearly identified
with the market. The six members from the army
and police were against it, and the rest went along
with them on economic issues (p. 147).
According to the author, there are a few forces
working against the present doi moi policy. One is
public anger over leadership corruption which has
arisen under this policy. He describes the
pervasive influence of corruption as follows.
Corruption is becoming the scourge of the
party and therefore the nation, depriving the
leaders of the obedience they covet and making
it impossible to attain any type of rational,
durable economy. It is now systematic and it
has made access to political and state power,
not creative economic entrepreneurship, the
principal determinant of who becomes rich and,
above all, how they do so. (p. 78)
Nepotism, probably even more than in China,
has been the single most important (but
certainly not the only) mechanism since the
mid-1980s in defining the way the "market" IS
replacing the "socialist" economy. (p. 122)
The problem of corruption began as early as
the 1950s. Under doi moi policy, corruption meant
money. Before that policy, however, since there
was not much money going around, corruption took
the form of nepotism in cadre recruitment,
promotion and educational opportunities.
The party after 1954 created a system that
was both organized and informal for retaining
social and political power in the hands of its
original members, their families, and their
descendants. The majority of the advanced
educational opportunities were reserved for
their children, and the second and third
generations who eventually took over were
qualified far less by their technical.
bureaucratic competence, in the formally neutral
Weberian sense, than by their social and family
ties, which became a prerequisite for entering
the bureaucracy. They were trained, of course,
but this system gave mediocrity and nepotism a
decisive preference over talent. When joining
the party, children and siblings of existing
members were admitted without investigation,
and naturally they swelled its ranks. Separate
schooling encouraged intermarriage, and the
party in most locations, especially urban, is a
distinct social, ed ucational, and political caste.
(pp. 121-122)
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The corrupt leaders are, for example, party
cadre at the village level who took advantage of land
redistribution; urban party leaders who collaborate
with businessmen (particularly in Ho Chi Minh
City) in bending rules and stripping public property
for them; Politburo members who promote market
reform and unconscionably enrich themselves.
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, their leader. was
publicly accused of corruption via his wife by his
former boss Nguyen Van Linh (who promoted
market reform under his prodding) (p. 141). Such
a pervasive image of corruption has created many
critics of doi moi policy.
The second source of anti-market forces is the
intellectuals who share the socialist ideals with the
author and lament the reemergence of the ills of
capitalism the Communist Party fought to eradicate
(p. 128). The market economy and capitalism refer
to the same economic system which the Party
wanted to destroy. By calling it a market economy
(which, the author says, is "a euphemism for
capitalism": p. 13) , the Party cannot change its
nature: such ills as a class society are reemerging.
The only way to restore the credibility of the Party,
they argue, is to renounce doi moi and go back to a
centrally planned economy. If market reformers
argue that a planned economy did not work in the
past. they would say that was because it was not
given a real chance: the Vietnamese economy was
too decentralized for central planning to work (p.
67) . Many of these intellectuals belong to the party
theoretical institute (the author does not say which
institute, p. 130) and express themselves relatively
freely through the media they control.
The third source of opposition is the army (and
police). Of the three sources, it is the army which
puts muscle into opposition. The author does not
make it very clear why the army is against market
reform. There is some discussion on this (e.g. pp.
131-132) , but something seems to be missing. The
author explains the army's opposition as follows.
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There was nothing in the army's past that
hinted they might challenge civilian authority,
but doi moi severely tried them all personally.
Apart from the way it neglected millions of
veterans and their families, reform ruthlessly
cut military pay to well below that of
production and administrative workers.
Career officers' pensions, in particular, were
gutted, compelling many of them to remain
beyond their twenty-five-year service obligation.
Some were faced with up to fifteen or more
years of additional duty. If anything could
arouse their opposition, this was it. (p. 131)
Clearly. the material threat posed by doi moi to
the army was an important reason for its opposition.
but a much deeper reason seems to be involved. As
the author says. the structure which was suited for
winning a war became "counterproductive the
moment it ended" (p. 148). The army was a very
important part of the old structure. Even in
postwar years, it played an important role for some
time, for what had been won in the war had to be
consolidated and the military situation in Cambodia
stabilized. But over time. especially by the late
1980s when Vietnamese troops were withdrawn
from Cambodia, economic reconstruction had taken
top priority, and the unproductive army become a
burden. So the trend was to diminish the army's
role as well as its budget. The author tends to
emphasize the latter as the reason for its opposition,
but the former seems to have been equally (if not
more) important.
Certainly, the army's opposition is oppor-
tunistic, since it is the power. not ideology, that it is
defending; but it commands a great weight when it
wants to act politically: after all, a large number of
soldiers died or were hurt in fighting for the
socialist goals (the number of soldiers killed on the
Communist side alone is estimated to have been
around 900,000) . so that the army is in a better
position to question. if it wants to. why it is
necessary to adopt a market economy which negates
such goals. The market reformers cannot offer a
good explanation without calling into question the
fundamental premises of Communist ideology.
Besides, the army could rely on nationalistic
sentiments by insinuating that the market reformers,
who have to be internationally oriented because
open economic policy is an important part of market
reform, were the lackeys of the very imperialists the
Vietnamese had fought against. When the
"imperialist elements" such as the IMF and the
World Bank request painful economic adjustment,
anti·foreign sentiments win the hearts of many
people, who suffer the consequences.
This is not the place to criticize the author's
anti-market philosophy. To do so would take much
space and not yield anything particularly new. The
positive side of this book for the market'oriented
economists is, as pointed out above, that it makes
them reflect on the problems of market reform in
Vietnam. Let me recapitulate by putting them in a
comparative perspective. One problem is shared
with China which, like Vietnam, promotes a market
economy while retaining the Communist ideology: it
is how to appease the opponents who argue validly
that a market economy negates the basic tenets of
Communism_ Market reformers are vulnerable to the
counterattacks of the old guard. The second is
unique to Vietnam. Because it fought a long,
difficult war, the army became a powerful
organization, and it does not want to give up power
when national priorities do not require it anymore.
But by saying that the party is "on the verge of
disappearing in all but name" (p. 165). the author
seems to imply that market reformers will
eventually win out. Even so. one wonders how fast
(or slow) the pace of reform will be. But will the
army really lose out? If so. what market forces will
defeat it? Will money be a solution? These questions
should be kept in mind in observing the future
evolution of Vietnam.
(Yoshihara Kunio <lfJ!K)... t-.1.::> . CSEAS)
Henk Schulte Nordholt. The Spell of Power: A
History of Balinese Politics 1650-1940. Leiden:
KITLV Press, 1996, 389p.
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